Employer Granted Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act for Claims Arising from an Employee’s Threatening Emails and Postings

Case: Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., No. 1-03-CV-001573 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th Dist. 12/14/2006)

The One Sentence Summary: Recognizing that the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“CDA”) provides broad immunity to a “provider...of an interactive computer service,” the appellate court held that an employer was immune from state tort claims arising from the wrongful actions of an employee.

What They Were Fighting About: An employee of Agilent Technologies, Inc. (“Agilent”) pleaded guilty to sending threatening emails over the internet and posting threatening messages on internet bulletin boards. The plaintiffs were the victims of the employee’s internet diatribes. They sued Agilent for infliction of emotional distress, arguing that the employee used the employer’s computers to post his unlawful communications. Agilent moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from state law claims pursuant to section 230 of the CDA, which grants immunity to “interactive computer service” providers or users.

Appellate Court Holdings:

• The court held that Agilent successfully asserted the three elements necessary to claim immunity under section 230 of the CDA. First, the court concluded that an employer “that provides its employees with Internet access through the company’s internal computer system” is a “provider or user of an interactive computer service” within the meaning of the CDA. Second, given that the plaintiffs were suing because of the employee’s cyberthreats it was clear that they sought to treat Agilent “as a publisher or speaker.” Finally, the information at issue was clearly “provided by another information content provider” (i.e., the employee) and not Agilent. Accordingly, Agilent was immune from the plaintiffs’ tort claims.
• Even though the court awarded Agilent immunity, it nonetheless addressed the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As a threshold issue, the court determined that the employee’s conduct was “extreme and outrageous.” Liability, however, did not attach to his employer because (1) the employer did not ratify the employee’s actions, (2) the employee’s actions fell well outside the scope of his employment, and (3) Agilent did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs.